INTRODUCTION
Securities fraud litigation under Rule lOb-51 threatens all pub licly traded companies: according to the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, in 1998 a securities fraud lawsuit was filed for nearly every day that the stock markets were open.2 Some of these lawsuits appear to be frivolous, triggered by inevitable fluctu ations in stock prices (so-called "fraud by hindsight" complaints3), while others represent legitimate efforts at private enforcement of the securities laws.4
Disposition on the pleadings is a critical defense strategy for all securities lawsuits. Securities fraud lawsuits that withstand a 12(b )( 6) motion almost always settle, regardless of the actual merits of the case or the probability of success at trial,5 because of the massive discovery and defense costs associated with such suits.6 Because Rule lOb-5 requires a showing of scienter, a mental state embracing "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"7 defendants can often successfully dispose of a securities fraud case before being forced to settle by challenging the plaintiff's scienter pleading.8 For these reasons, the standard for pleading scienter is an appropriate context in which to balance the competing interests of eliminating abusive claims and permitting meritorious ones.9
Prior to the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform Act"),10 the federal circuit courts of appeals had varying interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b )'s11 application to pleading scienter in a securities fraud law suit.12 The Ninth Circuit's standard was quite liberal, while the will follow the stylistic convention of the majority of courts, and generally refer to the "State ment of Managers." 5. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 32 (" [I] nnocent parties are often forced to pay exorbitant 'settlements.' When an [issuer] must pay lawyers' fees, make settlement pay ments, and expend management and employee resources in defending a meritless suit, the issuers' own investors suffer. Investors always are the ultimate losers when extortionate 'set tlements' are extracted from issuers.").
6. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995) , reprinted in 1995 U.S. C. C.A.N. 679, 685 ("The dynamics of private securities litigation create powerful incentives to settle, causing securities class actions to have a much higher settlement rate than other types of class actions .... The settlement value to defendants turns more on the expected costs of defense than the merits of the underlying claim."); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) ; Securities Litigation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Congress 35-36 (1994) (statement of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt); H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 15 (1995 ). 7. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976 . Rule lOb-5 on its face contains no explicit scienter requirement, but the Supreme Court inferred one in Ernst & Ernst.
8. Cf. Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin. of the House Comm on Commerce, 104th Cong. 199 (1995) 
(testimony of Arthur
Levitt, SE C Chairman) (describing Rule 9(b) challenges as " [t] he device most frequently used to screen out defi cient securities fraud claims").
9. See In re Tnne Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1993 ) (observing that an overly rigid standard will create "opportunity for unremedied fraud," while an overly lax standard will create "opportunity to extract an undeserved settlement"); City of Painesville v. First Montauk Fm., Corp., 178 F.R.D. 180, 187 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 10. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S. C.).
11. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances consti tuting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of m ¥t d of a person may be averred generally.").
12. Each circuit had articulated some common law pleading standard. For example, the Frrst Circuit required, plaintiffs to plead facts with such particularity as to make it reasonable to believe that the defendant acted with scienter. See, e.g., Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1��2) . The Second Circuit required plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference .
of.scienter., See, e.g., O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936
Second Circuit's standard was quite strict. The Second Circuit re quired facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of scienter and per mitted two approaches to pleading such facts: alleging facts establishing both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or alleg ing facts sufficient to demonstrate circumstantial evidence of reck less or conscious wrongdoing.13 Because most corporate defendants are subject to personal ju risdiction in a variety of places, the variance among the circuits (particularly the lax Ninth Circuit standard), created strong incen tives for forum shopping and abuse. To address those concerns,14 Congress drafted the Reform Act in 1995 and passed it over President Clinton's veto in December of that year.1s The key text of the Reform Act, for purposes of this Note, is section 21D(b )(2) -"Required State of Mind," which provides that:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particu larity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. 16 Federal district courts have exhibited confusion about the mean ing of § 21D(b )(2), and the federal circuit courts of appeals have divided on the issue.17 As one judge has noted, "widespread dis agreement on the requirements of scienter permeates the federal F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991 ). The Third Circuit followed the Second. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 , 1418 (3d Cir. 1997 ) (noting absence of law in the Third Circuit prior to 1995 Reform Act and approving Second Circuit's standard for use in cases not governed by the Reform Act). In re Burlington Coat Factory arose before the effective date of the Reform Act. See 114 F.3d at 1418 n.6. The Ninth Circuit permitted plaintiffs to plead the allegedly false or misleading statements and why they were false or misleading. Plaintiff s were permitted to aver scienter generally. See, e.g., In re Glenfed Inc.
Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 , 1546 , 1548 -49 (9th Cir. 1994 ) (en bane).
13. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 , 1128 (2d Cir. 1994 ; In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69. This discussion focuses on the Second Circuit's case law because Congress focused on that case law when it undertook legislation on this issue.
14. See Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031 , 1038 (S.D. Cal. 1997 ) ("The PSLRA effec tively overturned the Ninth Circuit's lenient scienter pleading requirement •... "). Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 765 n.5 (enumerating the dates upon which the President vetoed the Act and both the House and Senate overrode his veto).
See Private Securities Litigation Reform
16. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. ill 1997).
17. There are currently four circuit court opinions addressing this issue. 1\vo, Press v. Chemical In v. Services, Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999) and Williams v. WMX Technologies, 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997 ) assume without argument that the Reform Act codifi ed the Second Circuit's pleading standard. The Third Circuit reached the same conclu sion in In re Advanta Securities Litigation, No. 98-1846 , 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999 . The Advanta court reviewed the legislative history in great detail, including the legislative history for the Uniform Standards Act (discussed infra notes 75-80 and accompa nying text), but ultimately concluded that "there is little to gain in attempting to reconcile the conflicting expressions of legislative intent." Advanta, 1999 WL 395997, at *7. The Third court system."18 Although § 21D(b )(2) adopts the Second Circuit's pleading standard verbatim -"facts giving rise to a strong infer ence" of scienter -it does not speak directly to the tests that the Second Circuit developed to explain that standard. Specifically, two issues remain unresolved. First, it is unclear whether a plaintiff may adequately plead scienter by pleading both motive and oppor tunity. Second, it is unclear whether or not a plaintiff may ade quately plead scienter by pleading circumstantial evidence of reckless conduct.
To address this confusion, it is helpful to distinguish between the Second Circuit's pleading standard and the tests developed by the Second Circuit to explain that standard. While some cases use the two concepts interchangeably,19 this Note reserves the terms "pleading standard" and "standard" for the requirement that plead ings raise a strong inference of scienter. This Note reserves the term "tests" to refer to the Second Circuit's explanation of the ways a plaintiff might demonstrate compliance with the pleading stan dard -a showing of motive and opportunity or a showing of cir cumstantial evidence indicating conscious or reckless wrongdoing.
Federal courts have sharply divided over the question of how section 21D(b )(2) is to be interpreted. The central district of California, in Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., has read the plain language of section 21D(b )(2) and its accompa nying legislative history to mean that Congress chose to codify both the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test and its circum stantial evidence of recklessness tests.20 The Marksman rule has Circuit therefore held that the plain language of the Reform Act, by incorporating the lan guage of the Second Circuit's standard, also incorporated its tests. 1999 WL 395997, at *7.
The Ninth Circuit, in In re Silicon Graphics In c. Securities Litigation, Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *1 {9th Cir. July 2, 1999), analyzed the legislative history, and concluded that the Reform Act required plaintiffs to plead "in great detail, facts that consti tute circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct." The opinion essentially tracks the analysis of the District Court opinion, In re Silicon Graphics In c.
Securities Litigation, No. C 97-0494, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7 {N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996 . In brief summary, the Ninth Circuit reached its holding by emphasizing elements in the legisla tive history suggesting that Congress intended to raise the pleading standard nationwide. Since the Second Circuit standard was in place when the Reform Act was enacted, the court reasoned, the Reform Act must impose requirements more strict than those imposed by the Second Circuit. See In re Silicon Graphics 1999 WL 446521, at *5. For a response to this reasoning, see in fra note 116 and accompanying text.
18. Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. CIV-96-1514 -PHX-RCS, at 19, (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998 (Broomfield, J.) (available at the Stanford Securities Litigation Clearinghouse {http://securities.stanford.edu) ).
19. When such cases rely upon portions of the legislative history stating that the Reform Act codifi ed the pleading standard for the proposition that the Reform Act codified the tests, this Note cites such cases verbatim, even at the risk of causing confusion. The use of "stan dard" and "test" by the cases does not necessarily track this Note's usage of those terms -in fact, part of this Note's argument is that some cases often mistake legislative history referring to the standards for evidence of codification of the tests. 23. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996 (holding that the Reform Act requires plaintiffs to allege "specifi c facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants").
24. See, e.g., Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997 ) (approving Norwood and Friedberg); Press v. Quick & Reilly, No. 96 CIV. 4278 (RPP), 1997 WL 458666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997 (holding that motive and opportunity alone are not sufficient -additional facts must also be pleaded giving rise to a strong inference of scienter); Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) Court has identified conference committee reports as "the authori tative source for finding the Legislature's intent"38 in part because they are the only documents that involve the collective understand ing of both houses of Congress.39 Furthermore, the legislative his tory outside of the Conference Committee report is essentially a wash, with comments from the Act's sponsors specifically disclaim-33. In re Tune Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (alteration in origi nal) (emphasis added) (quoting O'Brien v. Natl. Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)).
34. Legislative history is particularly essential when, as here, the plain text of the statute is remarkably sparse and the text itself adopts a judicially constructed standard. Contempo rary criticisms to the contrary notwithstanding, legislative history remains an appropriate aid to statutory construction. For a comprehensive review and response to criticisms of judicial use of legislative history, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in In terpret ing Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1991 Any inference that the Second Circuit's tests were codified by implication43 is disproven by the specific deletion of Senator Specter's proposed amendment. The Supreme Court has held that when a conference committee explicitly considers and then rejects text -for example, by deleting a portion of a bill in conferencethat consideration and rejection is compelling evidence of legisla tive intent and precludes interpretations that would reach the de leted result by implication.44 This rule is precisely applicable to the Reform Act. (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Grundfest memorandum] ("As I read the securities litigation conference report, the pleading standard is faithful to the Second Circuit's test. Indeed, I concur with the decision to eliminate the Specter amendment language, which was an incomplete and inaccurate codification of case law in the circuit."). 42. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995) , reprinted in 1995 U.S.C. C.A.N. 679, 694 ("The Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's caselaw interpreting this pleading standard, although courts may find this body of law instructive.").
43. See, e.g., In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846 , 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999 ) ("We believe Congress's use of the Second Circuit's language compels the conclu sion that the Reform Act establishes a pleading standard approximately equal in stringency to that of the Second Circuit."); Rehm v. Eagle Fm. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 , 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997 ) (inferring incorporation of the tests from Congress's decision "to incorporate verbatim the language of the Second Circuit Rule 9(b) standard"). The Senator's amendment adopted the guidance of the [S]econd [C] ircuit, but the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania completely omits a critical qualification in the case law. The courts have held that "where motive is not apparent, a plaintiff may plead scienter by identifying circumstances" indicating wrongful behavior, but "the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater" from the number of cases. 141 CoNG. REc. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). In other words, the rationale for removing Senator Specter's amendment was that the amendment failed to clarify the full effect that the presence or absence of motive and opportunity has upon a plaintiff 's showing. The Committee did not reason that motive and opportunity are now irrelevant -to the contrary, the Specter amendment failed to capture the full extent to which motive and opportunity are relevant.
48. In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846 , 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999) (" [I] f Congress had desired to eliminate motive and opportunity or recklessness as a basis for scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text of the Reform Act. In our view, the fact that Congress considered inserting language directly addressing this line of cases, but ulti mately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave the matter to judicial interpretation."); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 997-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *20 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Advanta for the same point).
49. 446521, at *5 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (citing footnote 23 and accompanying text for the propo sition that "the joint committee expressly rejected the Second Circuit's two prong test").
56. This Note uses the label "substantive" to refer to the plaintiff 's burdens at trial, and uses the term "procedural" to refer to the plaintiff 's burdens of pleading. Tue distinction is highly relevant, see Cox ET AL., supra note 4, at 698 (distinguishing "whether scienter has been shown" from the "very different question" of "whether plaintiffs ' complaint adequately Section 21D(b )(2) specifies that a pleading must give rise to a strong inference of "the required state of mind" -a phrase that necessarily incorporates the scienter requirements of the underlying substantive law.57 This means that Congress sought only to change the pleading standard, not the underlying substantive law, with § 21D(b )(2).
Because every circuit court to consider the question has held that recklessness suffices substantively (to prove liability)S8 it would be anomalous to read footnote 23 as prohibiting plaintiffs from pleading recklessness, thereby imposing a higher burden on plain tiffs at the pleading stage (before discovery) than they would bear at trial (after discovery).59 One might argue that Congress intended to change the substantive securities law "through the back door" and merely chose to pursue that goal through procedural reform in order to avoid the political difficulty of appearing to be "pro securities fraud."60 As Chairman Levitt has suggested, however, it pleads scienter"), because the Reform Act changed only the pleading requirement, not the substantive law defining various securities fraud offenses. Tex. 1998) (noting that the Reform Act "by its own terms, does nothing to alter the level of intent previously required" and "clearly does not attempt to supply a specific level of intent, but refers the reader to whichever cause of action in the Securities and Exchange Act a plaintiff brings suit"). S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976 Cong. 18 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Act Hearing] (statement of Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman). Chairman Levitt has described cases raising the pleading standard as "indirectly [affecting] the substantive liability require-is unlikely that this was Congress's intent,61 and courts should not assume duplicity on the part of the legislature in the face of a clear, textual command and even clearer legislative history. Moreover, the safe harbor provision, which protects certain classes of reckless statements, would be superfluous if recklessness were not within the scope of the Reform Act. Fo otnote 23 lists motive and opportu nity and recklessness all in the same sentence: "For this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."6 2 That sentence cannot mean one thing for the first two elements in the clause ("motive, opportunity") and something entirely different for the third element ("recklessness"). Fo otnote 23 is an all-or-nothing aff air: if it does not prohibit the recklessness test, it cannot prohibit the motive and opportunity test either.
A comparison between the scienter pleading provision of the Reform Act and the safe harbor provision further proves that Congress did not intend footnote 23 to imply an "actual knowl edge" standard. In the safe harbor provision, Congress expressly requires a showing of "actual knowledge ... that the statement was false or misleading."63 The stark absence of any similar language in § 21D(b)(2) strongly implies that Congress did not intend § 21D(b )(2) to require "actual knowledge."64 The contrast with the safe-harbor provision also goes to show that the Reform Act could not have been meant to compel strict adherence to the Second Circuit's tests.Gs ments of the securities laws themselves." 1997 Act Hea ring, supra, at 23 (statement of Arthur Levitt). If one were prone to believe that the Silicon Graphics line of cases is correct, one could believe that Congress intended to change indirectly the substantive liability require ments -in other words, to change the substantive securities law through the back door. One might defend that argument by suggesting that the political difficulties associated with overtly sanctioning securities fraud might compel Congress to approach the substantive law through the vehicle of procedure. Footnote 23 should instead be understood as a reference to the Specter amendment.66 The Ni nth Circuit's conclusion to the con tary notwithstanding,67 the conclusion that Congress deliberately declined to codify Senator Specter's articulation of the tests does not entail the conclusion that they affirmatively rejected all use of the Second Circuit case law.68 In fact, as Senator Dodd explained, one rationale for rejecting the Specter amendment was that it failed to capture the full detail and sophistication of the contemporary Second Circuit case law.69 Numerous statements in the legislative history to the effect that courts may find the Second Circuit's case law instructive70 indicate that removal of the Specter amendment did not constitute a conclusive rejection of the Second Circuit's tests.
proposed in the Specter Amendment, would have been inconsistent with the safe harbor's requirement of 'actual knowledge' for forward-looking statements." (citation omitted)).
66. See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210; SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 29 {identifying footnote 23 as an explanation of the deletion of the Specter amendment).
67. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *4 {9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (citing as evidence of a raised standard, the fact that "Congress declined to enact an amendment that would have adopted the Second Circuit rule").
68. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics 1999 WL 446521, at *20 {Browning, J., concurring and dis senting) {"The legislative history suggests, however, that the Committee rejected language added by the Specter Amendment because it was 'an incomplete and inaccurate codification' of Second Circuit case law, not because the Committee intended to restrict the ways in which a 'strong inference' of scienter might be shown. Indeed, supporters of the defeated Specter Amendment were assured that while the Reform Act did not expressly provide that plaintiffs could plead scienter based on recklessness or motive and opportunity to defraud, 'the gui dance [provided by Second Circuit case law] is still going to be there."' (citation omitted)); OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 89 n.4 {W.D.N.Y. 1997) {"Simply because Congress did not codify that case law by making those factors an express part of the pleading standard does not mean that Congress intended to overturn that case law."). It is noteworthy that the Specter amendment would have codified the "strong circumstantial evidence of con scious misbehavior" standard alongside the recklessness and motive and opportunity stan dards. See 141 CoNG. REc. S9,170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) {Amendment No. 1485). Ye t the same courts that see the Specter amendment as decisive on the question of whether reckless ness or motive and opportunity survived do not hold that "circumstantial evidence of con scious misbehavior" was prohibited as well. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 40 {"This conclusion was reached [by Judge Smith in Silicon Graphics] despite the fact that in deleting the clarifying amendment, the Conference Committee deleted not only the language regard ing motive, opportunity, and recklessness, but also the language regarding conscious misbehavior.").
69. 141 CoNG. REc. S17,960 {daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (stating that "the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania completely omits a critical qualifica tion in the case law [namely that] 'where motive is not apparent, a plaintiff may plead scien ter by identifying circumstances' indicating wrongful behavior, but 'the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater"').
In later debates, Senator Dodd made clear that the removal of the Specter amendment ought not be interpreted as prohibition of the Second Circuit's tests. See 141 CONG. REc. S19,071 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (explaining that even after the removal of the Specter amendment, the guidance provided by Second Circuit case law will still be available to courts). President Clinton's veto message, which asserted that the Reform Act set the standard so far above the Second Circuit level as to bar too many meritorious claims,71 does not compel a contrary result, because the post-veto debates override the veto message.72 President Clinton vetoed the Reform Act because he interpreted footnote 23 and the accompanying text, along with the removal of the Specter amendment, as evidence of a pleading standard higher than the Second Circuit's.73 The Supreme Court, however, has ex pressed significant skepticism about reliance on the comments of a bill's opponents as legislative history, on the grounds that such op ponents tend to "overstate [the bill's] reach."74 The Court has therefore held that it is not the "fears and doubts of the opposition" to which one looks when interpreting a statute, but rather the spon sors,75 who in this case said that President Clinton overestimated the import of footnote 23.76 For example, in the veto override de bate, Senator Domenici inserted a bill summ ary stating that the ob jective of section 21D(b ) (2) Subsequent legislative history deserves weight in the interpre tive process, even though it lacks both the force of law and of con temporaneous legislative history.81 Subsequent legislative history is at its most relevant when courts have based decisions on legislative history and Congress has then reviewed the same materials and drawn an opposite conclusion. 82
Precisely such a review and clarification has occurred with re spect to the Reform Act: the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 arose out of legislative hearings on the ef fects of the Reform Act. Congress heard testimony that a primary result of the Reform Act was to drive lawsuits from federal court into state court, to evade the strict federal pleading standard. The 80. Note that the "uniformity" referred to in the title of the Act is uniformity across the federal-state line. The purpose of the Uniform Standards Act is to preempt certain state securities fraud class action lawsuits, thereby preventing plaintiffs from circumventing the Reform Act by shifting to state courts. See id. at 2248. The Uniform Standards Act does not purport to legislate away the nonuniformity across the federal circuits.
81. The Advanta court declined to give the subsequent legislative history any weight at all . See In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 998-1846 , 1999 WL 395997, at *6 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999 ("[O] ur interpretation of the Reform Act is unaffected by the legislative history of the Standards Act."). While the Advanta court correctly cited Central Bank of Denver v. Firs t In terstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) for the point that the "interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute," courts should nevertheless not dismiss subsequent legislative history entirely. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979) (acknowledging rule that subsequent legislative history does not control, but stating that courts are remiss to ignore it completely); see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) (approving Cannon).
82. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 541 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion) (endorsing the use of subsequent legislative history in construing legislation "[e]specially .. , when the Congress has been stimulated by decisions of this Court to investigate the historical materials involved and has drawn from them a contrary conclusion"). The Glidden Court equates subsequent legislative history with subsequent interpretive legislation: "'I)'pical is a statement in the 1958 House Report .... Subsequent legislation which declares the intent of an earlier law . . . . is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of construction." 370 U.S. at 541 (internal question marks and citations omitted). To the extent that such an equiv ocation is plausible, other Supreme Court precedents approve the use of subsequent legisla· tion as an interpretive aid. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) ; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969) ; FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958) .
Senate therefore initiated the Uniform Standards Act to raise the bar in state court.83 During the debate over the Uniform Standards Act, the SEC expressed concern that it might lock in erroneous dis trict court holdings that rejected recklessness as a basis for pleading scienter.84 The Conference Committee addressed this concern by stating that "the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in this legislation is that neither the Reform Act nor S. 1260 in any way alters the scienter standard in Fe deral securities fraud suits."85 This passage attempts to remove any ambiguity surrounding the purpose of the Reform Act: Congress did not intend the Reform Act to change the underlying liability rules. The clear implication is that the pleading standard should not be interpreted so as to elimi nate recklessness as a method of pleading securities fraud. If reck lessness was not eliminated, neither was the motive and opportunity test,86 and the Second Circuit's interpretation of the pleading stan dard remains viable even under the Reform Act.
83. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3 (1998) .
See
Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC and Commissioners Isaac C. Hunt, Jr. and Laura S. Unger to Senators Alfonse M. D'Amato, Phil Gra=, and Christopher Dodd (Mar. 24, 1998) ("[W] hen the Commission testified ... we stated that a uniform standard for securities fraud class actions that did not permit investors to recover losses attributable to reckless misconduct would jeopardize the integrity of the securities markets. In light of this profound concern, we were gratified by the language in your letter of today agreeing to restate in S. 12 60's legislative history, and in the expected debate on the Senate floor, that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 did not, and was not intended to, alter the well-recognized and critically important scienter standard."); 1997 Act Hearing, supra note 60 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman) ("The Commission was able to support S. 12 60 only upon receiving assurances that legislative history would be in serted into the record making clear that the Reform Act was not meant to define or alter the state of mind requirements for securities fraud liability. "). 
C. The Policy Rationales Underlying the Reform Act Require Retention of the Second Circuit's Tests
Protection of investors and investor confidence is "the overrid ing purpose of our Nation's securities laws," and the purpose of the Reform Act. s7 Investors (and by extension, investor confidence) are protected by the deterrent value of private enforcement of the securities laws. If the scienter pleading standard were raised to cir cumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing, that deterrent value would diminish:
Ensuring that the scienter standard includes reckless misconduct is critical to investor protection. Creating a higher scienter standard would lessen the incentives for issuers of securities to conduct a full inquiry into potentially troublesome areas and could therefore dam age the disclosure process that has made our markets a model for other nations. The U.S. securities markets are the envy of the world precisely because investors at home and abroad have enormous confi dence in the way our markets operate. Altering the scienter standard in the way envisioned by some of these district court decisions could be very damaging to that confidence.ss
While the Reform Act focuses on decreasing securities lawsuits, that is only because Congress believed that the pendulum had swung too far toward securities fraud plaintiffs.s9 An interpretation of the Reform Act that raised the bar too high would be inconsis tent with the balance that Congress intended the Reform Act to strike. Complete prohibition of motive and opportunity pleadings would be inconsistent in precisely this fashion, because it would al most certainly preclude some legitimate complaints.90 Permitting recklessness and motive and opportunity to play some role in secur ities fraud litigation helps protect investors and maintain confidence by exposing fraudulent schemes that might withstand scrutiny under a more defense-oriented test. 89. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31 (" Congress has been prompted by signifi cant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits to enact reforms to protect investors and maintain confi dence in our capital markets.").
90.
See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210. suffices to establish liability under Rufo lOb-5).91 Subsequent legis lative history has made clear that Congress did not intend to change the substantive law of scienter: in other words, they did not intend to overturn the consensus of the circuits. The treatment of motive and opportunity tracks the treatment of recklessness -pleading motive and opportunity is neither per se sufficient nor per se insuffi cient. The need to maintain confidence in the securities market also supports the availability of the Second Circuit's tests.
III. CONGRESS LEFT COURTS TO DECIDE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS WHETHER p ARTICULAR SHOWINGS OF MOTIVE AND

OPPORTUNITY OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF RECKLESSNESS
GIVE RISE TO A STRONG INFERENCE OF SCIENTER
A small cadre of federal district courts has consistently held that the Reform Act codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard, a result that is logical given the plain text of section 21D(b )(2), but not the Second Circuit's tests interpreting that standard.92 This Part argues that these courts, led by In re Baesa Securities Litigation, are correct. The Reform Act essentially shifts the locus of uncertainty in federal securities fraud lawsuits. In the pre-Reform Act Second Circuit, and in post-Reform Act Marksman courts, the courts com pare a plaintiff's pleading with an ideal motive and opportunity pleading or an ideal recklessness pleading. The question becomes "is this allegation of motive and opportunity or recklessness suffi ciently specific and particular to give the test any teeth?" The Reform Act shifts the locus of uncertainty from the test itself to the antecedent and ultimately terminal question "has the plaintiff raised a strong inference of scienter?" Section III.A contends that the plain language of the statute and the legislative history dictate this interpretation. Section III.B demonstrates that the Baesa rule also best effectuates the policy goals of the Reform Act.
91. If recklessness is sufficient to establish liability, recklessness must also be a sufficient pleading. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Tue alternative, requiring a higher stan dard for pleading than for a showing of liability, requires one to believe that Congress in tended covertly to change the liability standard, a conclusion that courts should not accept. The Baesa rule is relatively simple: courts must conduct a fresh examination of each plaintiff's allegations, without regard to "for malistic categor[ies]" such as recklessness or motive and opportu nity, to determine whether a strong inference of scienter is raised.93
The Baesa court observed that section 21D(b )(2) merely adopts the strong inference standard but stops short of endorsing any particu lar method of raising a strong inference.94 The court then explained that:
The conclusion follows from the plain language of the statute that the mere pleading of motive and opportunity does not, of itself, automati cally suffice to raise a strong inference of scienter. This, of course, does not mean that particulars regarding motive and opportunity may not be relevant to pleading circumstances from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred. In some cases, they may even be sufficient by themselves to do so. But, under the Reform Act, and in contrast to prior Second Circuit prece dent, they are not presumed sufficient to do so. Rather, under the Reform Act formulation, the pleadings must set forth sufficient par ticulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the required scienter.95 The key to the Baesa rule is its refusal to determine the outcome of a motion to dismiss based on "formalistic categor[ies] such as mo tive and opportunity."96 Under the Baesa rule, recklessness or mo tive and opportunity are presumed neither sufficient nor insufficient. Further, those categories do not exhaust a plaintiff's potential options: just as a plaintiff might make a recklessness showing or a motive and opportunity showing that was sufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter, a plaintiff could also "impress[ ] upon the court a novel legal theory."97 The sole inquiry under this approach is the strong inference standard, and the court declines to take shortcuts by presuming either recklessness or motive and op portunity to be per se sufficient or per se necessary.98
The Baesa rule follows from the language of the Reform Act.
Congress codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard, but ex pressly refrained from codifying the Second Circuit's tests interpret ing the standard. The inevitable conclusion is that courts must examine a plaintiff's showings to determine if they meet the strong inference standard.99 The Reform Act, "while adopting the 'strong inference' requirement, makes no mention whatever of 'motive and opportunity,' nor singles out any other special kind of particulars as presumptively sufficient. "100 The Reform Act also does not single out any "special kind of particulars " as presumptively insufficient.
Thus, the Baesa rule merely asks courts to "appl[y] the statute as written,'' under which "allegations of motive, opportunity, or reck less behavior may still be relevant. "1 01
The Baesa rule is consistent with the key elements from the leg islative history that the Silicon Graphics court relied on. These ele ments all demonstrate that the Second Circuit's tests were deliberately omitted from the legislation. 10 2 The Baesa rule is con sistent with this point, because it does not give either recklessness or motive and opportunity presumptive weight. The Silicon Graphics rule also relies on citations to the legislative history tend ing to demonstrate that Congress intended to raise the overall bar for pleading scienter nationally, which would require raising the bar in the Second Circuit. 10 3 The Baesa rule is consistent with this point as well: under the Baesa rule, courts in the Second Circuit may no longer permit a pleading to survive as a matter of law merely because it contains allegations of recklessness or motive and oppor tunity. Instead, they must find that those allegations are sufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter on those fa cts. This raises the 99. In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846 , 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999 f Congress had desired to eliminate motive and opportunity or recklessness as a basis for scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text of the Reform Act. In our view, the fact that Congress considered inserting language directly addressing this line of cases, but ulti mately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave the matter to judicial interpretation."); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig. Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *20 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999 ) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Advanta for the same point).
100. In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997 ).
101. OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 89 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); accord Myles v. Midcom Co=unications, Inc., No. C96-614D (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 1996) ("The statute itself defines the standard and the statute is clear."), discussed in SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 44.
102. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1997 ) (citing the Statement of Managers for the proposition that the Conference Committee deliberately chose not to include references to recklessness or motive and opportunity in the pleading standard).
103. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics 1996 WL 664639, at *6 n.4 ("The Court finds that the legislative history, the most definitive part of which is the Conference Committee Report, establishes the SRA standard as stricter than the Second Circuit standard.").
Judge Smith drafted two opinions in Silicon Graphics. The first, 1996 WL 664639, at *1, was the original hearing. The second, 970 F. Supp. at 746, responded to a renewed motion to dismiss and a motion for su=ary judgment following plaintiffs ' submission of an amended complaint. For purposes of this Note, the two are functionally interchangeable, because Judge Smith incorporated her prior holding as to the pleading standard in her second opin ion. See Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 754 ("After reviewing the arguments and the legal authorities, the Court believes that its original interpretation was correct."). On April 2, 1993, Philip Morris announced that it would reduce the average price of its cigarettes, and therefore, that it expected earnings in the future to decline. Less than five hours later, the first of [ten] lawsuits [in two days] were filed .... Tw o of the complaints con tained identical allegations "that the defendants ... engaged in con duct to create and prolong the illusion of Philip Morris' success in the toy industry." Apparently, these complaints are lodged in some com puter bank of fraud complaints, available for quick access but without much regard to accuracy. 1 06
The case-by-case approach of the Baesa rule would control this problem better than a per se rule. While judges will certainly scruti nize complaints carefully under any rule, a generic complaint is surely easier to draft under a per se rule that has endorsed one or another formalistic test. A rule that mandates case-by-case analysis should result in more detailed scrutiny of a plaintiff's allegations, 16 (1995) (commenting that plaintiff's lawyers would "file suit within hours or days" of a stock drop "citing a laundry list of cookie-cutter com plaints"); see also 141 CoNG. REc. Sl9,064 {daily ed. Dec 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Faircloth) ("One law firm files a securities suit every 5 working days, one a week. They are just churning them out, whether there is any validity or not. That is how much it takes to meet the payroll, so they churn out one a week.").
compelling the plaintiff to put more detail and care into complaints, with an attendant decrease in cookie-cutter complaints. 1 0 7
Many Members of Congress regarded these boilerplate com plaints as paradigm cases of abuse of the litigation process.108 Plaintiffs' lawyers designed the cookie-cutter complaint to track language from the case law -the so-called magic words, in order to survive a motion to dismiss with minimal actual evidence of wrongdoing. Because 12(b)(6) motions must argue exclusively from the pleadings, such complaints often permitted plaintiffs to get to discovery. Once the plaintiff s got to discovery, they were able to extract the coercive results Congress sought to avoid. By depriving litigants of the "magic words " and thereby reducing boilerplate complaints, the Baesa rule should check generic litigation before it can develop into coercive settlements. Eliminating any possibility of pleading motive and opportunity, however, sets the bar so high as to risk excluding plaintiffs with le gitimate complaints.115 The Baesa rule effectively splits the differ ence by giving courts license to take notice of motive and opportunity when the facts are such that motive and opportunity genuinely raise strong suspicion without compelling courts to accept specious motive and opportunity showings that fail to invoke genu ine suspicion. Eliminating the presumption that pleading motive 110. See Cox ET AL., supra note 4, at 36-37 (reporting empirical research demonstrating that the U.S. securities market is efficient, i.e., that it rapidly incorporates information presented and adjusts prices accordingly). Hunt, Jr., SEC Commissioner) ("A higher scienter standard would lessen the incentives for corporations to conduct a full inquiry into potentially troublesome or embarrassing areas, and thus would threaten the disclosure process that has made our markets a model for na tions around the world.").
112. See Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31-32.
113. Malin, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1358.
114. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
115. See Clinton Ve to Message, supra note 50, at 2210; see also Rehm v. Eagle Fm . Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 , 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997 ) ("To impose a higher pleading standard would make it extremely difficult to sufficiently plead a lOb-5 claim -an outcome which would certainly be contrary to the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities laws.").
and opportunity is per se sufficient accomplishes Congress's goal of strengthening existing pleading requirements.116
One potential problem with the Baesa rule is the fact that Congress hoped that the Reform Act would reduce forum shopping by creating a nationally uniform pleading standard. The legislative history reflects such a goal,11 7 as does the subsequent passage of the Uniform Standards Act.118 The SEC rejected the Baesa rule pre cisely because "such a test is likely to produce varying applications of the pleading standards, a result contrary to Congress's goal of uniformity. "11 9
Substantial uniformity is generated, however, merely by the act of codifying the Second Circuit's pleading standard . 1 20 While dif- Nev. 1998 ). This argument is highly significant because it accounts for a key element in the legislative history that many courts have relied upon to strike down the "motive and opportu nity" test entirely. Tue Conference Report states that " [b] ecause the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading req uirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard." Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 41. Numerous courts have relied upon this language to strike down the "motive and op portunity" test. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996 . Tue Stratosphere court's reasoning -that eliminat ing "the ability to rely solely on motive and opportunity" strengthens the Second Circuit's standard, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1107-08, accounts for this language in a way that does not require courts to disregard the plain language of the statute, ignore significant threads in both the contemporaneous and subsequent legislative history, or dismiss the considered opinion of the administrative agency charged by Congress with interpreting the Reform Act.
117. See Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 41 ("Tue House and Senate hearings on securities litigation reform included testimony on the need to establish uniform ... pleading requirements .... ").
118. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998) ("A number of witnesses at the July 1997 hear ing advocated legislation to establish uniform standards for private securities class action litigation. This legislation is an outgrowth of the July 1997 hearings and subsequent investi gation and oversight by the Committee." (footnote omitted)).
119. SEC Brief, supra note 57, at 25 n.51. While arguing for the Marksman rule, the SEC makes the predicate arguments upon which the Baesa approach is based in an alternative argument -"[w)hether or not [ adoption of the Second Circuit tests) is compelled as a matter of legislative intent, Congress certainly did not foreclose the possibility of the use of the Second Circuit tests in applying the Reform Act's pleading standard. Id. at 16. At a minimum, therefore, this Court has the discretion to adopt the Second Circuit's tests as its own under the Reform Act." Id. Tue fact that the Second Circuit's tests are neither man dated nor forbidden by the Reform Act is the underlying rationale for the Baesa approach. In its amicus brief at the district court level, the Commission more directly approved the Baesa reasoning: "Congress simply elected not to attempt to codify the guidance provided in Second Circuit case law, preferring to leave to the courts the discretion to create their own standards for determining whether a plaintiff has established the required strong inference."
Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 99, 325 (N.D. Cal. 1996) quoted in SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 42. 120. Professor Grundfest has stated that codification of the Second Circuit's pleading standard, even absent codifi cation of the tests, achieves adequate uniformity. See Grundfest memorandum, supra note 40, at S19,068 ("As I read the securities litigation conference re port, the pleading standard is faithful to the Second Circuit's test. Indeed, I �oncur with the decision to eliminate the Specter amendment language, which was an incomplete and inaccu rate codification of case law in the circuit .... [C) odification of a uniform pleading standard in lOb-5 cases would eliminate the current confusion among circuits. Tue Second Circuit ferent courts will surely see different showings as sufficient or not sufficient under the Baesa standard, thus giving rise to some incen tive to forum-shop, the result would be no different under the Marksman rule, as empirically demonstrated by inconsistent rulings within the Second Circuit.121 If the Second Circuit can have signifi cant internal variance in its interpretation of the motive and oppor tunity test, it would be naYve to assume that there will not be even more variance as the other eleven circuits interpret and apply it.
Further, the Silicon Graphics rule would also risk this same incen tive to forum shop, since it would replace the tested and interpreted Second Circuit's standards with an untested and uninterpreted "cir cumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing" standard. Fa ced with the specter of allowing probable fraud to go unpunished, one can easily imagine district court judges reaching widely varying con clusions as to precisely what constitutes circumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing.
The Baesa rule is a direct application of the plain language of the statute. To reject it based on the uniformity issue is to ignore the language Congress actually codified in favor of a collage of snippets from the legislative history. Courts should generally de cline to do this,122 especially when the relative uniformity to be gained is so minimal.
* * *
The Baesa rule properly charts a course between two extreme alternatives. The Marksman approach, treating recklessness and motive and opportunity as codified, undoes too much of the Reform Act. It would permit coercive, cookie-cutter complaints and would allow generic litigation without actual evidence of wrongdoing. The Silicon Graphics approach, rej ecting both reck lessness and motive and opportunity, takes the Reform Act too far. It would block complaints with genuine merit and would encourage corporate officials to remain purposefully ignorant of securities standard is among the most thoroughly tested, and it also balances deterrence of unjustified claims with the need to retain a strong private right of action ...• In short, I support the pleading provision of the conference report.").
121. Comp are In re Tune Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 270 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that where defendant offered stock to raise capital for debt repayment purposes, plaintiff adequately alleged motive by alleging that defendant intended to artifi cially enhance the price of stock and thereby decrease dilutive effect of sale) with San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 813-14 {2d Cir. 1996) (holding that, where defendant issued $700 million in debt securities, plaintiff did not ade quately allege motive by alleging that defendant intended to maintain the company's bond or credit ratings to secure favorable debt terms).
122. While it is always relevant, legislative history cannot override a clear statutory man date. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, {1989) {holding that the clear meaning of the statute trumps contrary legislative history); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (same). The legislative history relied on by the Baesa rule is not excluded by these cases because it is consistent with a plain reading of the statute.
fraud. The Baesa rule finds an effective middle ground by denying litigants the ability to withstand 12(b)(6) motions merely by com plying with a set formula, but still permitting litigants to plead reck lessness or motive and opportunity when they have genuine reason to do so.
CONCLUSION
The plain language of the Reform Act simply requires that plaintiffs in federal securities fraud cases plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. Conspicuously absent, however, from the plain language of the Reform Act is any mention of tests such as motive and opportunity or circumstantial evidence of reckless ness. District courts under the Reform Act must therefore scruti nize the factual allegations in each securities fraud case to determine whether or not those allegations give rise to a strong in ference of scienter. In that regard, the Second Circuit's case law may, in Senator Dodd's words, be "instructive"123 -if particular Second Circuit opinions evaluate facts similar to those of a contem porary case, those opinions would be persuasive authority. To whatever extent a Second Circuit opinion gives comp elling reasons for its conclusion that a particular motive and opportunity or reck lessness showing raised a strong inference of scienter, those reasons would continue to be persuasive and relevant in the contemporary case.
The Baesa rule admits ambiguity, but only because it is balanc ing the conflicting demands of discouraging securities fraud and dis couraging frivolous lawsuits. As the case history in the Second Circuit amply demonstrates, phrases like "motive and opportunity" or "circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless wrongdoing" are far from precise formulations that judges may apply to reach clear and unambiguous results. The Reform Act shifts the locus of uncertainty from questions such as "is this allegation of motive suf ficiently specific to give the test any teeth?" to the dispositive ques tion "has the plaintiff raised a strong inference of scienter?" Courts may be guided by Second Circuit case law ip. answering that ques tion, but they may not regard it as determinative. Judge Brimmer's explanation in Queen Un o precisely captures the point of the Reform Act:
In short, the Reform Act requires that a court examine a plaintiff's allegations in their entirety, without regard to whether those allega tions fall within a formalistic category such as motive and opportu nity, to determine if the allegations permit a strong inference of fraudulent intent. If the facts alleged permit such an inference then a 123. 141 CONG. REc. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
